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CAFA'S IMPACT ON CLASS ACTION LAWYERS
HOWARD M. ERICHSON t
INTRODUCTION
Procedural reforms alter litigation options directly, but they alter
the litigation landscape in more ways than reformers anticipate.
Three years ago, Congress dramatically expanded federal jurisdiction
with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA),' a statute drafted
with no love for class action plaintiffs' lawyers. Those lawyers have
adapted to the statute, in part, by altering their forum-selection and
claim-selection strategies. Analysis of these adaptations offers an
emerging picture of the statute's impact on class actions and class ac-
tion lawyers. CAFA's impact on the class action bar deserves particu-
lar attention because, although the statute speaks the language of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, its message of mistrust was aimed squarely at
the lawyers.
CAFA, like every other major class action development of recent years,
was born amidst snide remarks about lawyers' inventing lawsuits and ma-
nipulating the system to enrich themselves at others' expense. PoliticiansS2
and other CAFA proponents called class action lawyers self-interested, un-
t John J. Gibbons Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School; Visiting Professor,
Fordham Law School. The author thanks Edward Hartnett, Alison Nathan, and Ben-
jamin Zipursky for helpful thoughts on an earlier draft; John Coffee, Robert Heim,
and Deborah Hensler for their comments on the Article at the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review Symposium; and Robert Gonello and Sunila Sreepada for excellent
research assistance.
I Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2 See, e.g., Remarks on Signing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 41 PUB. PA-
PERS 265, 266 (Feb. 18, 2005) (reproducing President Bush's remarks that class actions
can be "manipulated for personal gain," quoting an editorial calling class actions "an
extortion racket"); 151 CONG. REC. H726 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) (supporting CAFA in order to "keep class members from being used
by the lawyers they never hired to engage in litigation they do not know about or to
extort money they will never see"); 151 CONG. REC. S1007 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005)
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (describing the "intolerable practice" of lawyers gaming the
system and stating that "many believe the only interests served by these settlements are
those of the class counsel"); Chuck Grassley, Should Congress Step in To IRefonn the Current
System of Class-Action Lawsuits?, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Nov. 12, 2002, at 46, 46 (describ-
ing the need for CAFA because of class actions in which "the plaintiffs' lawyers made
piles of cash, while the plaintiffs received little of anything").
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scrupulous,3 unprincipled,4 and unaccountable." When past reforms
targeted class action lawyers, however, some of those lawyers made out
quite well, proving that as lawyers adapt, the fittest may not only sur-
vive but thrive.
Recent class action reforms-the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995 (PSLRA),5 the Supreme Court's 1997 and 1999 set-
tlement class action decisions in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor 7 and
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.," and the Rule 23 amendments of 20039-have
addressed a variety of legal issues but share a common theme of mis-
trust. Each sought to tighten controls on class action lawyers to re-
duce abuse in light of problems of agency, autonomy, and leverage.
Add to this picture the criminal prosecution of the Milberg Weiss firm
and several of its leading partners for payments to class representatives
in securities class actions,"' the criminal prosecution of plaintiffs' at-
torney Louis Robles for misappropriation of settlement funds, " a simi-
See, e.g., Editorial, Reforming Class-Action Suits, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Apr. 17,
2003, at 10 ("Class-action suits have also become an ATM for unscrupulous lawyers,
who win millions of dollars for themselves but sometimes leave clients empty-
handed."); Jennifer Garrett, Class Actions Get a Bad Reputation, CORP. REP. WIs., Nov.
2004, at 26, 26 ("Unscrupulous lawyers use class actions to seek windfall payouts for
their work with little redress for their clients."); Alan Levins, Op-Ed., Law Needed To
Stop Abuses by Unethical Class-Action Attorneys, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 10, 1999, at A19 ("These
unscrupulous individuals treat the suits as business ventures, manipulating the system
to increase their own material wealth, often at the expense of their clients and other
class-action members."); Tom McCann, Class Actions: The Battle Heats Up, Cmi. LAW.,
Apr. 2004, at 8, 60 ("You have class members getting dollar-off coupons while their
lawyers reap millions. You can see how such a system can be corrupted by unscrupu-
lous trial lawyers." (quoting tort reform advocate Victor Schwartz)).
4 See, e.g., Levins, supra note 3 (urging passage of CAFA to "put a halt to some of
the more extreme abuses by unprincipled plaintiffs' attorneys").
5 See, e.g., Editorial, Actions Without Class, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2001, at A14
("[T]he incentive structure of modern class-action litigation encourages bad behavior
by lawyers who are accountable to nobody.").
6 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
7 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
8 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
9 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c), (e), (g), (h) (as amended 2003). An earlier round of pro-
posed Rule 23 amendments resulted only in the 1998 adoption of the interlocutory
appeal provision of Rule 23(f). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (as amended 1998).10 See Nathan Koppel, In Role Reversal, Melvyn Weiss Is Indicted, WALL ST.J., Sept. 21,
2007, at All; Michael Parrish, Ex-Partner at Law Firm Pleads Guilty in Kickback Case, N.Y.
TINES, Oct. 10, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com (search archive for title).I SeeJay Weaver, Ex-Top Lawyer Robles Faces 15 Years in Jail, MIAMI HERALD, Sept.
18, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 18260565. The criminal matter involved Robles'
handling of nonclass settlements for thousands of asbestos plaintiffs, rather than a class
action, although Robles is known as a class action lawyer. See, e.g.,Julie Kay, Along for
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lar prosecution of several Kentucky mass tort lawyers, 12 and a spate of
civil lawsuits against mass litigators claiming that they breached their
duties to their clients, 13 and the environment of mistrust of mass litiga-
tors becomes even clearer. Even the Supreme Court's 2007 pleading
decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly14 can be viewed, in part, as an effort
to prevent lawyers from filing questionable class actions. 15
While these developments have profoundly affected class litiga-
tion, they have left largely untouched the basic class certification stan-
dard of Rule 23(a) and 23(b). 6  Rather than alter the basic test for
the legitimacy of a class action, CAFA and the other reforms tightened
procedural protections to prevent abuse of the class action device.
They regulated the selection of class counsel, tightened control of
the Ride, DAILY Bus. REV. (Fla.), Oct. 20, 2000, at 10 ("While some Miami lawyers are
just getting into class actions, Louis Robles has specialized in them since 1974. He's
raked in millions in fees by finding his own class-action lawsuits and getting in on the
ground floor, not by following the pack and then fighting to become lead counsel.").
12 See Andrew Wolfson, Lawyers in Diet-Drug Case Are Indicted, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), June 15, 2007, at IA (reporting the indictment of mass tort lawyers
Shirley Cunningham, William Gallion, and Melbourne Mills,Jr.).
13 See, e.g., Samuel Maull, Trial To Decide if Law Firm Fattened Fen-Phen Profit, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 30, 2007, at 64; Shelly Whitehead, Fen-Phen Suit Heads to
Mediation, KY. POST, Apr. 24, 2007, at IA.
14 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
15 In Twombly, the Court emphasized the size of the class action as one of the rea-
sons to demand a well-supported complaint before permitting the plaintiffs to obtain
expensive discovery:
That potential expense is obvious enough in the present case: plaintiffs rep-
resent a putative class of at least 90 percent of all subscribers to local tele-
phone or high-speed Internet service in the continental United States, in an
action against America's largest telecommunications firms (with many thou-
sands of employees generating reams and gigabytes of business records) for
unspecified (if any) instances of antitrust violations that allegedly occurred
over a period of seven years.
Id. at 1967.
16 The interpretation of the class certification standard continues to develop, of
course, and courts generally have become stingier about certifying class actions. For a
useful analysis of recent developments on class certification, see John C. Coffee Jr. &
Stefan Paulovic, Class Certification: Developments over the Last Five Years 2002-2007, 8
Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) S-787 (Oct. 26, 2007). Similarly, it is an exaggeration to
say that Amchem and Ortiz have left untouched the class certification standard. One
cannot understand the current meaning of Rule 23(a) (4) adequacy or Rule 23(b) (3)
predominance without Amchem, nor can one understand the current approach to Rule
23(b)(1)(B) limited funds without Ortiz. The Supreme Court treated those cases,
however, as applications of existing class certification standards, rather than as a break.
To the extent those cases broke new ground, it was in their frank recognition of the
dangers of trusting class counsel in settlement class actions.
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class counsel fees, toughened pleading requirements, reduced class
counsel's ability to dictate the choice of forum, facilitated interlocu-
tory appeals, and impeded settlement class actions and coupon set-
tlements. Taken together, the overall message of recent develop-
ments seems to be, "in theory, class actions are fine, but in practice,
don't trust the class action lawyers."
The history of recent class action reforms suggests that even if
changes are driven by wariness about class action lawyers, the adjust-
ments may have the unintended consequence of strengthening the
position of certain of those lawyers. Indeed, data on post-CAFA class
action filings suggest that, like the 1995 securities litigation statute,
CAFA has shifted class action practice in ways that will strengthen the
upper tier of the plaintiffs' class action bar.
Part I of this Article shows the extent to which CAFA was moti-
vated by a mistrust of class action lawyers. Part II places CAFA in the
context of other recent class action developments. Similar feelings of
mistrust motivated many of those developments, yet the changes-
particularly those brought about by the PSLRA-brought the unin-
tended consequence of enhancing the power of the strongest class ac-
tion law firms. Part III looks at data on post-CAFA shifts in class action
practice and the effect of those shifts on the class action bar. CAFA
has affected not only the division of labor between state and federal
courts, but also horizontal forum selection among federal courts and
class action claim selection. These changes, taken together, bode well
for the same upper echelon of firms that profited from the uninten-
tional impact of prior class action reform.
I. CAFA AND THE MISTRUSTED CLASS ACTION LAWYER
"The people in democracy do not distrust lawyers," Alexis de Toc-
queville wrote, "because they know that their interest is to serve the
people's cause; they listen to them without anger, because they do not
suppose them to have ulterior motives."' 17 Tocqueville never saw a
class action.
The combination of big money and clientlessness breeds mistrust.
CAFA's proponents successfully portrayed class action lawyers as op-
portunistic aggregators who get rich on litigation of their own making,
with little control by clients, little remedy for each client, and few clients
17 ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 254 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop trans., Univ. Chi. Press 2000) (1835).
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who even care enough to sue. At its core CAFA addresses subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, and to the extent federal jurisdiction statutes involve
mistrust, they ordinarily involve mistrust of state judges. Diversityjuris-
diction grew out of a mistrust of state courtjudges to administer and ad-
judicate cases without local bias.'8 Federal question jurisdiction grew
out of a mistrust of state court judges to pay sufficient attention to fed-
eral law claims. 19 The Class Action Fairness Act, too, was driven in sig-
nificant part by mistrust of state court judges, ° but unlike other juris-
dictional statutes, CAFA also centrally involved mistrust of lawyers:
untrustworthy lawyers necessitate monitors; untrustworthy monitors ne-
cessitate the empowerment of alternative monitors.2 '
CAFA dramatically expanded federal subject matter jurisdiction
over state law class actions. Before CAFA, if plaintiffs' counsel pre-
ferred state court, it was easy to avoid federal court simply by choosing
class representatives to destroy complete diversity,22 by naming a
18 "It is the generally accepted view that diversity jurisdiction was established to
provide access to a competent and impartial tribunal, free from local prejudice or in-
fluence, for the determination of controversies between citizens of different states." 15
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 102App.03[l] (3d ed. 1997)
(citing Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1883)); see also Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315, 336 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("It was believed that, consciously or
otherwise, the courts of a state may favor their own citizens.").19 "The primary purpose of the 1875 grant of federal question jurisdiction is to
ensure the availability of a forum designed to minimize the danger of hostility toward,
and specially suited to the vindication of, federally created rights." 15 MOORE ET AL.,
supra note 18, § 103.03 (citing Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 647 (9th Cir.
1984); Ivy Broad. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1968)).
20 See, e.g., Remarks on Signing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, supra note 2, at
266 (providing President Bush's remarks on the need for the legislation so business de-
fendants can avoid "sympathetic local courts" and "friendly local venues"); AM. TORT RE-
FoRM AsS'N,JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004, at 15 (2004) [hereinafter ATRA 2004 REPORT],
available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2004/hellholes2OO4.pdf ("For some
reason, these class action lawyers do not want to go to Federal courts. Now, why is
that? Because they can forum shop into Madison County, IL, where they get judges
and jurors to hammer the defendants with outrageous verdicts that benefit basically
only the attorneys." (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch)).CAFA does more than simply expand federal jurisdiction, and its other provisions
drive home the message of mistrust. The statute constrains the use of coupon settle-
ments, reflecting the expectation that lawyers cannot be trusted to settle in the class's
best interests. It also requires notice of proposed class settlements to government au-
thorities, on the theory that the class's lawyers cannot be trusted to present the full story
to the court, and that additional monitors are needed to protect class members' interests.
22 See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366-67 (1921) (requir-
ing, for diversityjurisdiction in a class action, complete diversity of citizenship between
the named class representatives and the defendants).
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nondiverse2 3 or in-state defendant, 24 or by asserting individual claims
below $75,000.25 CAFA permits federal jurisdiction over class actions
based on minimal diversity and an aggregate amount in controversy of
five million dollars.26 Moreover, it allows removal by any defendant,
even an in-state defendant. 27 The statute includes exceptions that pur-
port to keep local controversies in state court,2s but those exceptions
are quite narrow. 29 By replacing the complete diversity requirement
with minimal diversity, by eliminating the in-state defendant exception
and the unanimity requirement for removal, and by allowing aggrega-
tion of the amount in controversy, CAFA ensured that nearly all large-
scale class actions could be filed in or removed to federal court.
President Bush, signing CAFA in February 2005, emphasized his
mistrust of class action lawyers. He began by reaffirming, at least in lip
service, the importance of legitimate class actions: "Class actions can
serve a valuable purpose in our legal system. They allow numerous
victims of the same wrongdoing to merge their claims into a single
lawsuit. When used properly, class actions make the legal system more
efficient and help guarantee that injured people receive proper com-
pensation." 30 He turned quickly, however, to his main point: "Class
actions can also be manipulated for personal gain."3' Quoting an edi-
torial that called class actions "an extortion racket," the President
praised Congress for addressing the problem of class actions in which
23 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (interpreting the
diversity jurisdiction statute to require complete diversity of citizenship).
24 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000) (disallowing removal based on diversity jurisdic-
tion if any defendant is a citizen of the forum state).
25 See id. § 1332 (authorizing diversity jurisdiction only for claims in which the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969)
(requiring each class member to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, rather
than allowing aggregation of damages). In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.,
545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005), the Supreme Court interpreted the supplemental jurisdiction
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, to permit federal jurisdiction over class actions in which at least
one member meets the amount-in-controversy requirement, overruling Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). While the Exxon Mobil decision expands diversity
jurisdiction over certain class actions, it does not reach class actions in which no class
member's claim exceeds $75,000, nor does it alter the complete diversity requirement.
26 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2), (6) (Supp. V 2005).
27 Id. § 1453(b).
28 Id. § 1332(d)(3)-(4).
29 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context:
A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1439, 1536 (2008).
30 Remarks on Signing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, supra note 2, at 265-66.
31 Id. at 266.
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"lawyers went home with huge payouts, while the plaintiffs ended up
with coupons worth only a few dollars.
'"3 2
The President was echoing Congress. Although the statutory lan-
guage stopped short of "extortion racket," the congressional findings
in CAFA made the same point: "Class members often receive little or
no benefit from class actions, and are sometimes harmed, such as
where... counsel are awarded large fees, while leaving class members
with coupons or other awards of little or no value. '3
Individual legislators were blunter. Senator Orrin Hatch urged
passage of the bill as a way to curb the "intolerable practice" of law-
yers' gaming the system for their own advantage: "[L]et me explain
just how this game works. It starts with a few class action attorneys sit-
ting around a table, thinking of an idea for a class action lawsuit.
34
Hatch proceeded to describe the search for a deep-pocket defendant,
the naming of a lead plaintiff to avoid diversityjurisdiction, the search
for a compliant judge, and ultimately, the settlement of the action in
the lawyers' interests:
The real kicker is this: in some cases, many believe the only interests
served by these settlements are those of the class counsel. Again, they
will walk away with hundreds of thousands and sometimes millions of
dollars. And what do the class members recover? Perhaps a worthless
coupon.
There you have it, a successful gaming of the State tort system by the
class action lawyers.
This is an intolerable practice and one that the Class Action Fairness
Act will curb. 3
Representative Chris Cannon, speaking in favor of the House bill,
echoed Hatch's concerns and called the game "Class Action Monop-
oly. '3 6 Senator Chuck Grassley wrote that "increasingly these days,
32 Id.
13 CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(3), 119 Star. 4, 4 (2005).
34 151 CONG. REC. S1007 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
35 Id.
36 151 CONG. REC. H734 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Cannon).
Cannon spoke of "the game the class action lawyers play here and how they go about
abusing the court systems." Id. Like Hatch, Cannon emphasized the potential for
abuse in essentially clientless litigation:
The first thing they do is come up with an idea for a lawsuit. And then they
find a named plaintiff. It does not have to be someone who is actually injured
in the process. All the lawyer really needs is an idea for a lawsuit and potential
defendants who have deep pockets.
15992008]
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class action lawsuits are more likely to enrich the lawyers filing them
than compensate the consumers who've been harmed.,'3
During the years when CAFA was making its way through legisla-
tive channels, editorials, op-eds, and articles appeared in papers
around the country explaining the need for the statute in terms of
mistrust of both class action lawyers and state court judges. Back
when the bill was known as the Class Action Fairness Act of 1999, an
op-ed in the San Francisco Chronicle explained the problem as follows:
Today, the driving force behind many class-action suits is the plain-
tiffs' attorneys, rather than the plaintiffs themselves. These unscrupu-
lous individuals treat the suits as business ventures, manipulating the sys-
tem to increase their own material wealth, often at the expense of their
clients and other class-action members. Such manipulation results in a
381denial of due process to defendants, often corporations.
The op-ed extolled the bill as a solution to these problems. "The pur-
pose of the law is to reform the current system and put a halt to some
of the more extreme abuses by unprincipled plaintiffs' attorneys. 33
The Washington Post, urging passage of CAFA, editorialized in
2001 that "class actions are unusually prone to abuse, and the incen-
tive structure of modern class-action litigation encourages bad behav-
ior by lawyers who are accountable to nobody. '"4  The problem, ac-
cording to the editorial, is the clientlessness of class action practice.
"In many class actions.., the clients are something of a fiction of self-
appointed lawyers .... Essentially, the lawyers are representing them-
Id. Representative Sensenbrenner supported the inclusion of a consumer bill of rights
to "keep class members from being used by the lawyers they never hired to engage in
litigation they do not know about or to extort money they will never see." 151 CONG.
REC. H726 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
37 Grassley, supra note 2, at 46. He drives the point home by describing several
examples of "consumer-unfriendly" class actions, concluding that, "[r]egardless of
wrongdoing, such cases have one constant: the plaintiffs' lawyers made piles of cash,
while the plaintiffs received little of anything." Grassley linked the problem of unscru-
pulous lawyers to that of untrustworthy judges, stating that such lawyers "look for
courts that are quick to certify a class without adequately considering the interests of
all class members, or courts that aren't careful in evaluating whether the proposed
class meets the required criteria. Those state courts also are more likely to rubber-
stamp settlement proposals without scrutinizing them for fairness." Id.
Levins, supra note 3.
39 Id.; see also Dan Kelly, Class Action Suits Enrich Lawyers While Consumers Get Pennies,
READING EAGLE (Pa.), Dec. 31, 2003, at Al ("Lawyers abuse the class-action system by
bringing hundreds of national class actions in state courts that have little or no con-
nection to the controversy, the official said." (quoting an official of the defense lobby
Class Action Coalition)).
40 Editorial, supra note 5.
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selves. Having invented a client, the lawyers also get to choose a
court.",4' The Washington Post echoed the theme a year later: "In
normal litigation, aggrieved clients hire lawyers to represent them. In
many class actions, by contrast, lawyers appoint themselves to repre-
sent large numbers of people who may have no beef with the company
they find themselves suing, and who may not even learn they are suing
anyone."42 Again, the paper voiced the concern that class action law-
yers create and pursue the litigation for their own benefit rather than
for the benefit of class members: "At settlement time, the lawyers cash
in, while the 'clients' get coupons for product upgrades.,
43
Mistrust of class action lawyers, combined with mistrust of the
state court judges charged with monitoring them (or at least of the
state court judges whom class action lawyers were thought most likely
to seek out), propelled the expansion of federal jurisdiction over class
actions. CAFA's supporters linked the problem of "unscrupulous law-
yers" with the problem of "renegade state court"judges 4
Proponents of CAFA, even as they expressed their doubts about
the trustworthiness of the plaintiffs' class action bar, routinely pointed
out that they objected only to abuse of class actions by unscrupulous
lawyers, not the class action device itself.45 Some plaintiffs' class action
attorneys nonetheless perceived the legislation as an attack on their
41 Id.
42 Editorial, Restoring Class to Class Actions, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2002, at A22.
43 Id.
44 See Garrett, supra note 3, at 26 ("Unscrupulous lawyers use class actions to seek
windfall payouts for their work with little redress for their clients. They are aided by a
handful of renegade state court jurisdictions that have allowed class action cases to
proceed to settlement orjudgment without much precedent or, critics argue, merit.").
45 See, e.g., Remarks on Signing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, supra note 2,
at 265-66 (praising the "valuable purpose" served by class actions before bashing them
as an "extortion racket"); Editorial, supra note 3 (opening with the statement that
"[c]lass actions are an important tool for protecting citizens' rights" before explaining
the need for CAFA to curb abuse).
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46livelihoods, and could show that at least some CAFA proponents
viewed the legislation as a class action death knell.4'
II. CAFA IN THE CONTEXT OF RECENT CLASS ACTION DEVELOPMENTS
CAFAjoins a list of class action developments driven by concerns
that class action lawyers abuse the system. 48 Like CAFA, these devel-
opments reflect a mistrust of class counsel coupled with an acceptance
of the basic class certification standard. While they may have had
some success at curbing abuses, these developments have also had un-
46 Class action attorney Jerome Ringler argued, for instance:
The act's economic unfairness originates from a grave misperception: that
plaintiffs' attorneys make too much money, thus compelling a congressional re-
sponse. Are plaintiffs' attorneys, then, the first of many professionals to face this
brand of congressional scrutiny? How much longer until Congress decides that
doctors or actors or athletes-or defense attorneys-make too much money?
Jerome Ringler, The Unfairness of the Class Action Fairness Act, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2006, at
52, 52.
47 See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1475, 1476 (2005) ("The admitted goal of congressional class action 'reform' is to save
class actions by destroying them as viable state court proceedings and transferring
them (at the whim of any single class member or defendant) to the federal system,
where, the lobbyists in favor of 'reform,' at least, have promised the suits will languish
and die.") (citing CitiGroup Global Markets, Industry Note, FLASH-Senate Just
Passed Class Action Bill-Positive for Tobacco (Feb. 10, 2005)).
48 CAFA arrives at a time of deep mistrust of mass litigators, which can be seen (as
both cause and effect) in the proliferation of indictments, disciplinary actions, and
civil lawsuits against mass plaintiffs' lawyers. The nation's leading securities class action
firm, Milberg Weiss, was indicted along with several of its partners and former partners
on charges that it made illegal payments to class representatives. See Peter Elkind, The
Law Firm of Hubris, Hypocrisy & Greed, FORTUNE, Nov. 13, 2006, at 155; Koppel, supra
note 10. The Milberg Weiss indictments are hardly the only proceedings against mass
litigators in the last couple of years. Florida plaintiffs' lawyer Louis Robles was indicted
in 2006 on federal mail fraud charges relating to the misappropriation of $13.5 million
in settlement funds belonging to his asbestos clients. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Miami Attorney Indicted for Misappropriating at Least $13.5 Million in Cli-
ent Settlement Money (May 23, 2006), available at http://miami.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/
pressre106/mm052306.htm; see alsoJordana Mishory, Asbestos Clients of Lawyer Who Stole
from Them Told They Can't Sue To Collect $13.5 Million from Florida Bar, BROWARD DAILY
Bus. REV. (Fla.),Jan. 4, 2007, at 1. New York plaintiffs' firm Napoli Bern Ripka, which
represented thousands of fen-phen plaintiffs, faces claims that it negotiated a mass set-
tlement that provided the firm with more than its legitimate share of the funds. An-
thony Lin, Trial Ordered over Firm's Role in "Fen-Phen "Pact, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 28, 2007, at 1.
Three Kentucky mass tort attorneys were accused in 2006 of misappropriating more
than half of a $200 million settlement fund. See Fen-Phen Lawyers Told To Disgorge $20
Million, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 20, 2006, at 18; Three Fen-Phen Lawyers Indicted on Fraud Charges,
NAT'L L.J., June 18, 2007, at 3; Three Ky. Fen-Phen Attorneys Are Suspended, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 28, 2006, at 3.
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intended consequences such as strengthening the upper tier of the
class action bar.
Most significantly for our purposes, the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act (PSLRA), adopted in 1995, tightened the pleading
standard for securities lawsuits and reformed the process for selecting
class representatives and class counsel. Like CAFA, the PSLRA sought
to make it more difficult for lawyers to abuse class actions for their
own advantage. Senator Alfonse D'Amato spoke of "a feeding frenzy
for plaintiffs' lawyers" in which lawyers take advantage of the unfair-
ness of the system: "It is time to reform the securities class action liti-
gation from a moneymaking enterprise for lawyers into a better means
of recovery for investors. 4 9 He emphasized that the bill was aimed at
untrustworthy lawyers: "[I]n this bill we go after the greatest abuse
that is taking place, which is lawyers who do not represent the general
public but represent themselves. 5 °
Many have noted that while the PSLRA may have been aimed at
bringing down the leading class action lawyers, it had the opposite ef-
fect.51 Some describe the PSLRA as aimed directly at the Milberg
Weiss firm:
49 141 CONG. REc. 35,238 (1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
50 Id. at 35,240. Similarly, speaking in favor of overriding President Clinton's veto
of the PSLRA, then-Representative Charles Schumer described the need to end "frivo-
lous securities suits":
Under the current system lawyers often bring lawsuits immediately after a
drop in a company's stock price, without any further research into the real
cause of the price decline. As a result the suits often have no substantive
merit, but they have the effect of presenting the company with the unhappy
choice between a costly, lengthy discovery process and an exorbitant, unjusti-
fied settlement. And what's worse, an inordinate share of the ultimate settle-
ment often ends up in the pockets of the lawyers who brought the case, rather
than in the bank accounts of the shareholders on whose behalf the lawyers os-
tensibly filed in the first place.
141 CONG. REC. E2437 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep. Schumer). Repre-
sentative Schumer explained that his goal was not to eliminate class actions, but rather
to correct certain abuses: "This bill goes a long way toward correcting these abuses
without curtailing the essential rights of shareholders to sue corporations and insiders
when there is legitimate evidence of fraud and deception." Id.
51 See, e.g., Timothy L. O'Brien, Behind the Breakup of the Kings of Tort, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 2004, § 3, at 1 (calling the PSLRA "a measure aimed squarely at Milberg,
Weiss," and reporting that "in the end, the act gave Milberg, Weiss-which could af-
ford lengthy investigations-an advantage over smaller competitors and encouraged
the firm to hunt bigger game"). But see Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securi-
ties Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106
COI.UM. L. REv. 1489, 1517 (2006) (showing that by one measure, market share con-
centration may have decreased post-PSLRA, and that although Milberg Weiss held a
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Take, for instance, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, a
1995 law that many observers say was aimed at putting Milberg Weiss-
and especially partner William Lerach, the lawyer many corporate execu-
tives love to hate-out of business. As one securities defense lawyer who
lobbied for the PSLRA told The New Yorker last year, "The whole idea be-
hind the law was to destroy Lerach."52
The effect, however, was not what proponents had intended.
"[T] he PSLRA inadvertently benefited the larger plaintiffs' firms, [se-
curities lawyers] say. The result has been a much more concentrated
securities plaintiffs' bar dominated by big firms."3  A study of post-
PSLRA securities class action settlements through 2003, for example,
showed that "the law firm of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach
LLP was involved as lead or co-lead plaintiff counsel in over 50% of all
post-Reform Act cases settled to date." 54
Before the PSLRA, prosecuting a securities case was relatively
cheap. Under PSLRA's heightened pleading standard, however, "firms
had to pony up enormous sums of money to draft a complaint that
would withstand the inevitable motion to dismiss, with the very real pos-
sibility that they would never see a return on their investment."55 The
PSLRA's presumptive selection process for lead plaintiff and class
counsel similarly raised the cost of doing business for plaintiffs' securi-
ties class action lawyers. "Before the PSLRA was passed, almost any in-
vestor would do; the goal was simply to get to the courthouse
first... ."5" The PSLRA replaced the race to the courthouse with a se-
lection process focused on institutional investors. "As a result, plain-
tiffs firms have had to sink enormous amounts of cash into marketing
their services to institutional clients, particularly pension funds, which
are most likely to be appointed lead counsel in any given case.",5
dominant market both before and after the PSLRA, the cumulative share of the next
four firms dropped in the post-PSLRA period).
52 Tamara Loomis, Milberg Weiss Stronger than Ever Despite Reform Act, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 25, 2003, at 4.53 Id.
54 LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST-REFORM
ACT SECURITIES LAwSUITS: SETFLEMENTS REPORTED THROUGH DECEMBER 2003, at 14
(2004).
55 Tamara Loomis, In Spite of Reform Law, Milberg Weiss Emerges as Winner in Securities
Suits, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 22, 2003, at 1.
Id.
57 Id.; see also id. ("Few firms have the financial resources to sink millions of dollars
into developing a complaint, and even fewer are willing to take the risk of losing it all on
a motion to dismiss. For the cases that survive, the chances that a firm not appointed
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The PSLRA's sanctions provision also may have driven smaller
firms out of the market. Former Milberg Weiss partner William Ler-
ach, noting the study that showed an increase in his firm's appearance
rate, wrote of the statute's opposite effect on smaller firms:
[A]s Congress was warned when it was considering the Reform Act, the
mandatory sanction review provision of the Reform Act was so draconian
that it inevitably would result in many competent but smaller firms or
sole practitioners refusing to bring securities class action suits, no matter
how meritoriots they might believe the case to be.... We have seen
smaller firms or sole practitioners either not file securities class actions
cases, even though they were meritorious, or to seek out larger, more
well-capitalized litigation partners to joint-venture cases with them.
Certain amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, like
the PSLRA, grew out of concerns that class action lawyers may too eas-
ily abuse the system for their own benefit. After years of Advisory
Committee proposals and public comment, the Supreme Court
adopted amendments to Rule 23 in 1998 and 2003. Significantly, de-
spite efforts at more fundamental class action reform, 59 neither set of
post-1966 amendments touched Rule 23(a) or (b), which lay out the
requirements for class certification. Instead, the amendments focused
on procedural protections in class actions. The 1998 amendment cre-
ated Rule 23(f), which provides for interlocutory appeals of class certi-
fication decisions at the discretion of the court of appeals.0 In 2003,
the Court adopted a broader package of Rule 23 amendments.
Driven by recognition of the risk that class counsel may pursue and
settle class actions on terms more favorable to counsel than to the
class, the 2003 amendments tightened the process for approving class
settlements61 and added new subsections addressing appointment of
class counsel 6 and awards of attorneys' fees.
61
lead counsel will make any real money are slim. As a result, the small practitioners for
the most part have given up on securities work, [one plaintiffs'] lawyer said.").
58 William S. Lerach, "The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995-27 Months
Later": Securities Class Action Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's
Brave New World, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 612-13 (1998).
59 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S. (JCUS), PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Aug.
1996); Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, JCUS, Proposed Amendments to
Rules of Civil Procedure (Feb. 1995 & Nov. 1995 Drafts), reprinted in Edward H. Cooper,
Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13 app. at 53-73 (1996).
60 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
61 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
62 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g).
6.3 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h).
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The Supreme Court's most significant recent class action deci-
sions came in a pair of asbestos settlement class actions. In Amchem
Products v. Windsor,6 the Court rejected a Rule 23(b)(3) settlement
class action, and in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,6 ' it rejected a Rule
23(b) (1) (B) limited-fund settlement class action. Both cases involved
concerns that class action lawyers might agree to settle on terms dis-
advantageous to the class in order to earn substantial fees or to gain
66advantage in settlements of nonclass claims, and sensitized federal
judges to the "reverse auction, 67 risk in settlement class actions.
6 8
III. CAFA's IMPACT ON CLASS ACTION LAWYERS
If the PSLRA and other class action developments have had the
unintended consequence of strengthening a segment of the class ac-
tion bar, will CAFA do the same? Early indications suggest that it may.
Understanding the statute's impact requires an appreciation of
the resilience of mass litigators. Plaintiffs' lawyers have shown repeat-
edly that if certain avenues of mass litigation are foreclosed, they find
69other avenues. Mass disputes do not disappear, so neither does mass
64 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
65 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
66 See, e.g., id. at 855 (noting that the settling nonclass "inventory" clients of class
counsel "appeared to have obtained better terms than the class members"); Amchem,
521 U.S. at 593 (expressing concern that a lawyer negotiating a settlement-only class
action lacks settlement leverage).
67 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1370-73 (1995).6 See Smith v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 387 F.3d 612, 614-15 (7th Cir. 2004) (reject-
ing a settlement class action in part because class counsel, when negotiating the set-
tlement, lacked the leverage of a certified litigation class action); T.R. Goldman, Shat-
tering Reform Myths, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 7, 2005, at I ("With cases forced into federal
court, there will be fewer chances for companies to work the so-called reverse auction,
which allows defendants to play one set of plaintiffs off another in order to achieve the
lowest settlement price.").
69 See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Langer Loyalty and Client Auton-
omy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 530-43 [hereinafter
Erichson, Beyond the Class Action] (describing nonclass mass litigation that functions
like class actions); Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Im-
plications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 386-417
(2000) (describing lawyer coordination in related lawsuits as a substitute for formal
aggregation); Howard M. Erichson, Mississippi Class Actions and the Inevitability of Mass
Aggregate Litigation, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 285, 287-96 (2005) [hereinafter Erichson, Mis-
sissippi Class Actions] (discussing the extent of mass aggregate litigation in Mississippi
despite the absence of a class action rule). Francis McGovern expects unintended con-
sequences from litigation reform in general and class action reform in particular:
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litigation; it just reappears in different forms. Call this the Whac-a-
Mole 0 effect. Knock the mole down in one spot, and it pops up in
another.
CAFA's Whac-a-Mole effect manifests itself in several ways. The
main point of CAFA was to permit defendants to remove large-scale
class action litigation from plaintiff-favored state courts to federal
courts. The data suggest that it is doing exactly that, as federal courts
have experienced a significant upswing in class actions since CAFA's
enactment. But class action plaintiffs' lawyers have not simply contin-
ued to file the same class actions they would have filed pre-CAFA, ac-
cepting the inevitability of removal to federal court. Rather, like the
mole, they have popped up in different places. Early data suggest that
class action lawyers have altered both the nature of their lawsuits and
the forums in which they bring them. By looking at how CAFA has al-
tered class action forum shopping and claim selection, we can better
understand its likely impact on the class action bar.
A. CAFA 's Impact on Forum Selection
To the extent a class action litigant prefers federal over state
court, CAFA's impact is direct and obvious. Its impact on forum
shopping, however, goes well beyond the vertical (federal-state)
choice of forum. CAFA alters the horizontal (state-state or district-
district) forum-selection game by shifting the action from state to fed-
eral court. Whereas pre-CAFA forum shopping by class action plain-
tiffs focused on identifiable jury pools andjudges, often in small coun-
ties, post-CAFA forum shopping focuses on circuit law, and more
often lands in big cities.
There is little question that CAFA has succeeded in shifting much
class action litigation from state court to federal court since it went
into effect on February 18, 2005. The Federal Judicial Center (FJC)
released a preliminary study in April 2007 showing a significant in-
Although the authors of reform have the advantage of defining the rules of
the game, there is the related disadvantage of being a stationary target. The
range of options to circumvent stable rules is continuously subjected to the in-
ventiveness of counsel. Given sufficient financial incentives or a narrowing
range of alternative litigation opportunities, the marketplace of litigation has
been fertile ground for unpredictable outcomes.
Francis E. McGovern, Common Themes and Unintended Consequences in Class Action Reform,
83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1107, 1112 (2005).
70 Thanks to Charles Sullivan for the metaphor.
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crease in federal court class actions, and concluding that "CAFA to
date has had its intended effect of bringing more state-law diversity
,7 'class actions into federal district courts." Looking at federal court
class actions filed or removed during six-month periods from mid-
2001 through mid-2006, the study found a forty-six percent increase
from the first period (July-December 2001) to the last (January-June
2006). The preliminary FJC data show a notable jump when CAFA
took effect, growing by nineteen percent from the second half of 2004
to the first half of 2005:
Table 1: Federal Court Class Action Filings and Removals73
July-Dec. Jan.-June July-Dec. Jan.-June July-Dec. Jan.-June
2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006
1573 1642 1655 j 1971 1891 1998
On a month-to-month breakdown, the highest number of class ac-
tions filed in or removed to federal court occurred in March 2005, the
first full month after CAFA took effect.4 Focusing on diversity juris-
diction class actions because they are the ones for which CAFA broad-
ened federal jurisdiction, the FJC researchers point out that the aver-
age number of diversity class actions per month increased from
twenty-eight cases per month pre-CAFA to fifty-six cases per month
post-CAFA.7'
Corresponding data from state courts is needed to confirm that
the FJC findings reflect a shift from state to federal court, rather than
simply a growth in class actions.6 A study of California class actions,
71 THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF
THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNEss ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: THIRD INTERIM
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 21
(2007) [hereinafter FJC THIRD INTERIM REPORT].
72 Id. at 2.
73 Data from Summary Table 1, E-mail from Thomas Willging to Howard Erichson
(Aug. 1, 2007) (on file with author).
74 Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act
on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1723, 1750 (2008).
75 Id. at 1751; see also FJC THIRD INTERIM REPORT, supra note 71, at 14 (reporting
an increase from 27.0 cases per month pre-CAFA to 53.4 cases per month post-CAFA).
76 See Lee & Willging, supra note 74, at 1748 (noting that accurate information on
state court class action activity is needed to confirm a CAFA effect, but that "informa-
tion on class action activity in the state courts of this kind is not available at this time").
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currently underway by California's Office of Court Research, should
help provide a clearer picture of CAFA's effect.7 The FJC's Novem-
ber 2007 progress report combines FJC federal court data with pre-
liminary data from the California research covering seven superior
courts including Los Angeles County. The data show a decrease in
California state court class actions from 2004 to 2005, alongside an
78even greater increase in class actions in the California federal courts.78
Although both the federal and state studies are ongoing and subject
to revision, these preliminary results strongly suggest that CAFA has
shifted class action activity from state courts to federal courts even as
the total number of class actions in California79 has grown.
Another hint of CAFA's state court impact may be seen in the
state court most often cited by CAFA's proponents as a symbol of class
actions run amok-Madison County, Illinois. During the late 1990s
and early 2000s, the Madison County courts received class action fil-
ings far out of proportion to the county's small population, and CAFA
proponents regularly referred to the county in their arguments for
federal jurisdiction. 0 Class action filings in Madison County totaled
106 in 2003 and 84 in 2004, but dropped sharply when CAFA took ef-
77 The study is being conducted by the Office of Court Research of California's
Administrative Office of Courts, in conjunction with Professor Richard Marcus of Hast-
ings College of the Law. The most recent FJC progress report on CAFA mentions the
FJC's collaboration with the California researchers and presents preliminary data on
the relationship between state and federal class actions in California. FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., PROGRESS REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON THE IMPACT
OF CAFA ON THE FEDERAL COURTS 3-5 (2007) [hereinafter FJC PROGRESS REPORT].
78 Id. at 4-5 & fig. 1.
The [Office of Court Research] found a decrease in California class action ac-
tivity between 2004 and 2005 in those seven superior courts; however, the
number of class action[s] found in 2005 still represented an increase over
2002 and 2003. By comparison, the FJC found a marked increase in class ac-
tion activity in 2005 in the four California federal district courts-especially in
the Central District of California, which includes Los Angeles County.
Id. at 4; see also Lee & Willging, supra note 74, at 1748 n.84 (reporting the same data).
79 The growth of total class action filings in California does not necessarily indicate
a nationwide growth in the total number of class actions. Because Ninth Circuit law is
relatively favorable to class certification, forum selection by class action plaintiffs' at-
torneys may give the California federal district courts a disproportionate share of post-
CAFA federal court class actions. On post-CAFA forum selection, see infra text accom-
panying notes 92-105.
80 Indeed, when President Bush signed CAFA, he described his recent visit to
Madison County and introduced a class member who received a coupon settlement
from a Madison County class action. Remarks on Signing the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005, supra note 2.
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fect, with 36 class actions filed from January 1 through February 17,
2005, but only 10 filed during the remainder of 200581 and only 3 in
2006.2 Madison County's judiciary underwent reforms during the
same period, 3 so the decline in class actions may not be due entirely
to CAFA, but the sudden drop in filings at CAFA's effective date
strongly suggests that the statute had its intended effect in a forum at
which it was unabashedly directed.
CAFA has increased not only the number of class action removals
to federal court, but also the number of class action original filings in
federal court.84 Indeed, the increase in original filings exceeds the in-
85crease in removals. During the years leading up to CAFA, most di-
versity class actions in federal court got there by removal, but since
81 Ann Knef, Class Action Fairness Act: Is It Working?, MADISON-ST. CLAIR REC. (Ill.),
Mar. 27, 2006, at 1; Shruti Date Singh, Madison County Goes Quiet: Class Actions Halt Af
terFederal Law, Ill. Courts Curb Forum Shopping, CRAIN'S CHI. BUS., Sept. 11, 2006, at 1.
82 Ann Knef, A TRA's Excerpts: Callis Credited for Madison County's Improvements,
MADISON-ST. CLAIR REc. (Ill.), Dec. 24, 2007, at 2 (citing AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, JUDI-
CIAL HELLHOLEs 2007, available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf
[hereinafter ATRA 2007 REPORT]). The 2007 report's numbers differ slightly from
those cited in earlier articles; it states that Madison County had 106 class actions in
2003, 87 in 2004, and 56 in 2005. ATRA 2007 REPORT, supra, at 20.
83 See Steve Gonzalez, Madison, St. Clair Drop Down in "Hellhole" Ranking, MADISON-
ST. CLAIR REc. (111.), Dec. 18, 2006, at 1 (describing new rules implemented in Madi-
son County); ATRA 2007 REPORT, supra note 82, at 19-20 (crediting largely the reform
efforts of ChiefJudge Ann Callis).
84 Although Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg's findings on CAFAjudicial
activity may appear to contradict this, there is no inconsistency. Clermont and
Eisenberg studied all reported cases on CAFA during its first two and a half years.
They found that ninety-one percent of the district court CAFA cases had been removed
from state court rather than filed originally in federal court. Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1553, 1562 (2008). Because the study looks only at reported opinions that mention
CAFA, however, it reflects a specific subset of the universe of federal court class ac-
tions, and is particularly unlikely to reflect the overall rate of removals and original fil-
ings, as Clermont and Eisenberg acknowledge:
Probably the difference shows merely that among CAFA class actions, re-
moved cases are the ones generating pitched battles and hence published
opinions, and especially opinions that expressly mention the Class Action
Fairness Act or CAFA. The difference between the two studies thus may re-
flect the danger of relying only on published cases to get a picture of what is
really happening on the ground.
Id. at 1563.
85 FJC THIRD INTERIM REPORT, supra note 71, at 16-17.
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CAFA's enactment, most diversity class actions in federal court were
filed there originally.8
"As removal becomes more predictable," the FJC report explains,
"plaintiff attorneys might decide to file actions initially in federal
court to avoid the costs and delays associated with removal.",8  Others
have made similar observations, such as one defense lawyer who de-
scribed post-CAFA class action practice: "We have seen in our practice
more plaintiffs' lawyers filing in federal court. They're recognizing
reality-they don't want to be frustrated by the delay of filing in state
court, then getting removed to federal court."8 8
The delay involved in the removal process, however, is not the
only reason plaintiffs' attorneys choose to file originally in federal
court. They file in federal court in order to choose the forum8 9
Upon removal, federal court venue lies in the district in which the
state court is located. 90 If the plaintiff files the action originally in fed-
eral district court, by contrast, the plaintiff can choose any district
court with proper venue and with personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendants. In nationwide class actions, plaintiffs often can choose from
a number of federal districts.
When plaintiffs choose to file originally in federal court, the rules
of the forum-selection game change. State court forum selection of-
ten focuses on courts with relatively clear characteristics in the jury
pool and a relatively small pool ofjudges. Oft-cited examples include
Madison and St. Clair Counties in southern Illinois, Jefferson County
in Mississippi, and Hidalgo and Jefferson Counties in Texas. 9'
86 Lee & Willging, supra note 74, at 1752 (reporting that pre-CAFA diversity remov-
als and original filings averaged 16.6 and 10.8 per month respectively, and post-CAFA
diversity removals and original filings averaged 23.7 and 31.5 per month respectively).
87 FJC THIRD INTERIM REPORT, supra note 71, at 16.
88 Bob Yates, Class Action Fairness Act; More than a Year Later, CHI. LAW., Dec. 2006,
at 54, 55 (quoting Michael Pope).
89 See FJC THIRD INTERIM REPORT, supra note 71, at 17 (noting that by filing class
actions in federal court as original proceedings, "plaintiff attorneys retain a choice of
forum at least to the extent that, in a given case, jurisdiction and venue rules allow fil-
ing in more than one federal forum").
90 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (2000) (permitting removal "to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending").IN The best-known list of plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions is the American Tort Re-
form Association's (ATRA) controversial annual list of 'Judicial Hellholes." ATRA's
final pre-CAFA report featured the following top five "hellholes": Madison County,
Illinois; St. Clair County, Illinois; Hampton County, South Carolina; the State of West
Virginia; and Jefferson County (Beaumont), Texas. SeeATRA 2004 REPORT, supra note
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Federal court forum selection generally does not allow such spe-
cific jury-pool shopping, as federal courts pull potential jurors from
broader areas that include multiple communities. Rather, federal
court forum selection tends to focus on the law applied by the courts
of appeals, and sometimes on specificjudges hearing related cases.92
The law on class certification varies from one circuit to another.93
John Coffee and Stefan Paulovic, surveying recent developments,
point to the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits as relatively liberal on
class certification, and the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits as rela-• 94
tively conservative. The Eleventh Circuit appears receptive to class
actions as well." Given the centrality of the class certification deci-
sion, class action attorneys must take these differences into account
when choosing a federal forum.
96
20, at 14-25. The previous year, ATRA's top five were Madison County, Illinois; Jeffer-
son County, Texas; the 22ndJudicial Circuit (Copiah, Claiborne, andJefferson Coun-
ties), Mississippi; Hidalgo County, Texas; and Orleans Parish, Louisiana. See AM. TORT
REFORM ASS'N, BRINGINGJUSTICE TOJUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2003, at 3-8 (2003) [herein-
after ATRA 2003 REPORT], available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2003/
report.pdf. Madison County topped ATRA's list in 2002, 2003, and 2004, before drop-
ping to fourth in 2005, sixth in 2006, and finally dropping off the list in 2007. See
ATRA 2007 REPORT, supra note 82, at 19-20. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce similarly
identifies court systems that its members consider unfriendly to businesses; in 2004, its
top four business-unfriendly state court systems were Mississippi, West Virginia, Alabama,
and Louisiana. See Martin Kasindorf, Robin Hood Is Alive in Court, Say Those Seeking Lawsuit
Limits, USA TODAY, Mar. 8, 2004, at 1A. For a counterperspective, see CONGRESS WATCH,
PUB. CITIZEN, CLASS AcTION 'JUDICIAL HELLHOLES": EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS LACKING
(2005), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/OutlierReport.pdf.
92 For an analysis of various factors that affect class action forum selection, see
Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action
Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591 (2006).
93 One report quotes defense lawyer Stanley Parzen on federal forum shopping:
"In a securities context for instance, in the 4th and 5th Circuits if you have in-
dividual representations and the plaintiff has to show reliance, that individual
issue is very likely going to doom a class action in those circuits without any
doubt whatsoever," he says. "In the 2nd Circuit, it's not quite as clear. You
might be able to do it anyway."
Jarrett Banks, Plaintiffs Find Loopholes in Class Action Fairness Act, CORP. LEGAL TIMES,
June 2005, available at http://www.insidecounsel.com/section/litigation/135.
Coffee & Paulovic, supra note 16, at S-819; see also Yates, supra note 88, at 56
("'But even in the federal court system,' Michael Pope said, 'different circuits are more
class action-friendly than others. The Seventh Circuit applies a pretty careful standard.
They're less inclined to certify than other circuits."').
95 See e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2004) (certifying a
class action against HMOs).
96 Looking at pre-CAFA class action data, John Coffee and Stefan Paulovic ob-
served that CAFA might alter forum selections:
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The FJC data show that, while every circuit experienced some
post-CAFA increase in diversity class action filings, the growth varied
dramatically. 97 The district courts within the Ninth Circuit saw by far
the biggest post-CAFA increase, growing nearly sixfold from 2004.'8
Given lawyers' perception of the Ninth Circuit as relatively liberal on
class certification, the disproportionate growth of filings in its districts
should come as no surprise. Nor is it surprising to see large jumps in
diversity class action filings within the Third Circuit, where they nearly
quadrupled, and within the Second and Eleventh Circuits, where they
more than doubled. '9 The growth was much smaller in the Fourth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.'00
More telling, the relatively class-friendly circuits saw dispropor-
tionate increases in original proceedings, as compared with other cir-
cuits that on the whole saw greater increases in removals. In the D.C.,
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the post-
CAFA increase in original filings outpaced the increase in removals,
while in the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, the increase in
removals was larger than the increase in original filings.'0 ' In other
Overall, the inter-Circuit pattern seems highly stable-but again CAFA could
disrupt this stability. Recognizing that their class actions could be removed
from state courts under CAFA, plaintiff's attorneys may instead file class ac-
tions initially in "friendly" jurisdictions, such as the Second and Ninth, rather
than see them removed to "unfriendly" federal courts in the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits.
Coffee & Paulovic, supra note 16, at S-789-80.
97 Figure 5 in the FJC report shows the disparate effect of CAFA in the various fed-
eral courts of appeals, with by far the biggest increase in the Ninth Circuit. FJC THIRD
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 71, at 18 fig.5.
98 See id. at 18 (reporting that the number of diversity class actions in the district
courts of the Ninth Circuit "increased almost six-fold after CAFA, accounting for 30%
of the [nationwide] increase").
9 Id. at 18 fig.5; see also Lee & Willging, supra note 74, at 1759-60. It is more diffi-
cult to explain the significant growth of class actions within the Fifth Circuit, as Fifth
Circuit case law is not particularly helpful to class action plaintiffs. The Fifth Circuit
data might be attributable to Hurricane Katrina insurance litigation. See infra note
101.
100 FJC THIRD INTERIM REPORT, supra note 71, at 18 fig.5.
101 Lee & Willging, supra note 74, at 1760 fig.7 . Lee and Willging point out that
the FJC data do not perfectly match expectations of forum shopping based on circuit-
by-circuit differences in class certification. Most notably, the Fifth Circuit experienced
not only a significant post-CAFA increase in class actions, but more surprisingly a
greater increase in original class action filings than in removals. Id. at 1761. Lee and
Willging suggest, as one possible explanation, that during the relevant time period the
courts within the Fifth Circuit saw many cases relating to Hurricane Katrina insurance
coverage. Id. at 1761-62.
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words, it appears that while CAFA has enabled defendants to remove
class actions to federal courts where defendants see a strategic advan-
tage in removal, CAFA also has encouraged plaintiffs' lawyers to file
class actions in those federal courts perceived to be most amenable to
class certification.
Differences are even more dramatic at the district court level. Ac-
cording to the FJC data, seventy percent of the federal districts saw
post-CAFA increases in diversity class actions, sixteen percent de-
creased, and fourteen percent had no change. 0 2 Notable increases
occurred in the Central District of California, the District of New Jer-
sey, the Northern District of California, the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, and the Eastern District of New York. 103 This forum selection
is consistent with the perception of the Ninth, Third, and Second Cir-
cuits as providing relatively favorable law on class actions, 1 4 and may
also reflect perceptions of particular federal districtjudges. 105
In sum, CAFA appears to have altered the forum-selection calculus
for class action lawyers. Anticipating the likelihood of removal, plain-
tiffs' attorneys cannot simply seek favorable state court forums, many
of which were in smaller rural counties or blue-collar suburbs. Rather,
they choose to file originally in federal court, seeking the most favor-
able federal forums, including Los Angeles, San Francisco, NewJersey,
Philadelphia, and New York.
102 FJC THIRD INTERIM REPORT, supra note 71, at 19.
103 Id. at 19-20 & fig.6.
104 The FJC report points out that of the ten districts with the most diversity class
actions, nine saw at least a doubling of their diversity class action filings after CAFA;
the one exception was the Northern District of Illinois, which increased only by one
case during the relevant period. Id. at 20. The Northern District of Illinois falls within
the class-unfriendly Seventh Circuit, whereas the biggest growth districts were in the
Ninth, Third, and Second Circuits.
105 Ted Frank of the American Enterprise Institute, who favored CAFA and disfa-
vors most class actions, makes the following point about both districts and circuits:
"Federal courts do not create quite the same opportunities for forum-shopping that
the magnet jurisdictions of old did, but some opportunities are there." Ted Frank, The
Class Action Fairness Act Two Years Later, LIABILITY OUTLOOK, Mar. 2007, at 2, available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070327-Liability.pdf. He points to the Eastern District
of New York as an example, stating, 'Judge Weinstein's courtroom shows that there
are still some magnet jurisdictions out there, and that those magnets will grow even
stronger if the Second Circuit does not take a stand on defending federal class-
certification standards." Id. He points, as well, to "the beginning of a magnetjurisdic-
tion in the Ninth Circuit." Id. at 3.
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B. CAFA 's Impact on Claim Selection
Not only has CAFA altered the way class action lawyers think about
forum selection, it also appears to have altered the selection of class
action claims that lawyers choose to pursue. Growth in federal court
class actions after CAFA has not occurred evenly across types of suits.
To the extent certain types of class actions are perceived as less viable
in federal court than in the state courts where they would have been
brought before CAFA, adaptive claim selection offers a plausible ex-
planation for the differences.
The increase in federal court class actions has varied significantly
by type of case. Certain categories of class actions-contract, fraud,
property damage, labor-increased after CAFA, while personal injury
class actions decreased and civil rights class actions held steady."' 6 Per-
sonal injury class certification motions have been famously unsuccess-
ful in federal courts,"" even as they continued to have scattered suc-
cess in state courts."' The FJC data show no change or a slight
10 FJC THIRD INTERIM REPORT, supra note 71, at 3-15. Figure 1 from the FJC re-
port vividly illustrates the increase in labor, contract, and certain other types of class
actions in early 2005-CAFA took effect on February 18, 2005-while other types of
class action filings declined or held steady. Id. at 4 fig.1. Reporting a "marked increase
in the number of diversity class actions in federal court," the report notes that "[t] hese
additional cases so far have primarily been contract and common-law fraud cases, plus
a small number of property damage class actions." Id. at 21.See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab.
Litig., 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir.
1996); In reAm. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Gen. Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995); Blain v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
240 F.R.D. 179 (E.D. Pa. 2007); InreVioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. La.
2006); Sanders v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No. 03-2663, 2006 WL 1541033 (D.N.J.
June 2, 2006); Sweet v. Pfizer, 232 F.R.D. 360 (C.D. Cal. 2005); In re Prempro Prods.
Liab. Litig., 230 F.R.D. 555 (E.D. Ark. 2005); Harris v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 218 F.R.D.
590 (S.D. Ohio 2003); In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197 (D. Minn. 2003);
Benner v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 214 F.R.D. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Paxil Litig.,
212 F.R.D. 539 (C.D. Cal. 2003); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 208 F.R.D. 625
(W.D. Wash. 2002); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., 208 F.R.D. 133 (E.D. La. 2002).108 See Mark C. Weber, Forum Allocation in Toxic Tort Cases: Lessons from the To-
bacco Litigation and Other Recent Developments, 26 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. 93, 96-97 (2001); see also, e.g., Settlement Agreement, Hoorman v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., No. 04-L-715 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 6, 2006), available at http://
www.paxilpediatricsettlement.com/pdfs/SettlementAgreement.pdf (approving set-
tlement class action in Paxil litigation).
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decrease in personal injury tort class actions' ° but an increase in class
actions claiming property damage," breach of contract,"' and
fraud." 2 To a class action lawyer deciding which mass litigation op-
portunities justify a substantial investment of time and money, per-
sonal injury class actions may have appeared worth pursuing in state
court before CAFA, but post-CAFA, if the cases would be removed to a
federal court where class certification is unlikely, the lawyer may
choose instead to pursue a different legal theory, demand a different
type of relief, or pursue different sorts of cases.
Many variables affect the frequency of each type of class action,
which makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about CAFA from
the differential growth rates among nature-of-suit categories. The
temporary decline in securities class actions,1 3 for example, during a
10 See FJC THIRD INTERIM REPORT, supra note 71, at 7 (reporting that federal court
personal injury class actions "reached their lowest level in the study period in January-
June 2006-forty-one cases, down from sixty-six cases in January-June 2005," and down
from a high of sixty-eight in January-June 2003); Lee & Willging, supra note 74, at
1756 (reporting that personal injury tort class actions in federal court averaged 7.1 per
month both before and after CAFA's enactment). Lee and Willging call the personal
injury data "somewhat unexpected" and suggest that the absence of any increase in
personal injury tort class actions in federal court "may signal some frustration of con-
gressional intent." Id.
"o See FJC THIRD INTERIM REPORT, supra note 71, at 7-8 (reporting an increase in
diversity jurisdiction property damage class actions from a monthly average of 1.7 pre-
CAFA to 4.2 post-CAFA).II See id. at 5-6 (reporting an increase in contract class actions based on diversity
of citizenship); see also Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 84, at 1562 (reporting that
most of the published judicial decisions on CAFA have involved contract and insurance
cases); Lee & Willging, supra note 74, at 1755 ("[M]uch of the increase in diversity fil-
ings and removals has been driven by a large increase in the number of state-law Con-
tracts actions filed in or removed to the federal courts.").
11 See FJC PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 77, at 7 (reporting that diversity jurisdic-
tion "other fraud" class actions numbered twenty-four in 2002, twenty-six in 2003, thirty
in 2004, and eighty-eight in 2005 (of which eighty-two were filed or removed after
CAFA took effect)); see also FJC THIRD INTERIM REPORT, supra note 71, at 10 (noting
that diversity jurisdiction "other fraud" class actions increased from a monthly average
of 2.3 pre-CAFA to 8.4 post-CAFA, while the average number of federal question "other
fraud" class actions remained stable).
13 SeeFJC THIRD INTERIM REPORT, supra note 71, at 12 & fig.2e (showing a decline
from 241 securities class actions in July-December 2001 to 110 in January-June 2006).
The pace of securities class actions picked tip again in 2007, according to a study by the
Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and Cornerstone Research.
See CORNERSTONE RESEARcH, 2007: A YEAR IN REVIEW 2 (2008), available at http://
securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse-research/2007-Y]R/20080103-01.pdf (finding a
forty-three percent increase in securities fraud class actions from 2006 to 2007).
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period when stock prices were stable or rising, 4 when several federal
appellate courts imposed more rigorous review of securities class certi-
fication," 5 and when the nation's leading securities class action firm
was under pressure from the federal prosecutors,"6 probably says
nothing about CAFA. Nonetheless, the overall picture painted by the
data, with distinct increases in certain types of class actions when
CAFA took effect, suggests that lawyers analyze class action claim se-
lection differently in federal court than in state court.
One intriguing question is what to make of the increase in federal
question class actions. Certain types of federal law class actions, nota-
bly Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) cases and federal consumer pro-
tection cases, increased in number after CAFA took effect. Labor is
the single largest category of class actions identified in the FJC study,
and the data show a marked post-CAFA increase in labor class actions,
particularly FLSA actions.1 7 Federal consumer protection class ac-
tions-claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, and the Truth in Lending Act-also rose in the
wake of CAFA."8
At first glance, one would not expect CAFA to affect federal ques-
tion class action filings, which could have been brought in federal court
even before CAFA."' Indeed, the FJC reports initially rejected any con-
nection between CAFA and the increase in labor class actions, reason-
ing that CAFA's jurisdictional provisions affected only diversity jurisdic-
tion: "There is no reason to think that CAFA affected labor cases, as
none of the 6,056 labor class actions identified in the study were based
114 See, e.g., Dow Jones Indexes 2000-2009 Decade Chart, http://djindexes.com/
mdsidx/downloads/2000_2009.pdf.
11 See Coffee & Paulovic, supra note 16 at S-787 (noting "more rigorous certifica-
tion criteria for securities class actions, which once were simple," as a major factor in
the decline of securities class actions in 2005 and 2006) (citing Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Initial
Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006); In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec.
Litig.. 432 F.3d I (lst Cir. 2005)).,I See Elkind, supra note 48 (describing the downfall of Milberg Weiss).
"17 FJC THIRD INTERIM REPORT, supra note 71, at 11. The increase is due to FLSA,
as the other category of labor class actions-ERISA actions-remained steady. Id.
118 The FJC's earlier research coded these cases in the catch-all "Other Statutory
Actions" category, but its November 2007 progress report shows the results of reclassi-
fying the federal consumer cases. FJC PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 77, at 5-6. The
Third Interim Report's Figure 1, supra note 71, at 4 fig.1, shows the growth in Other
Statutory Actions in 2005; the new information in the November 2007 progress report
helps to explain that growth.
119 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (granting original federal jurisdiction over claims
arising under federal law).
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on diversity of citizenship." 20 While CAFA's direct impact was limited
to diversity class actions, however, its indirect impact probably accounts
for some of the increase in federal question class actions.
CAFA may have increased federal question class actions in at least
three ways. First, it eliminates the forum-selection disincentive to as-
serting federal claims. Before CAFA, plaintiffs committed to preserv-
ing a state court forum would have omitted federal law claims, relying
instead solely on state law theories, to avoid removal based on federal
question jurisdiction. To the extent CAFA renders an action remov-
able without regard to federal question jurisdiction, it frees the plain-
tiff to assert federal legal theories instead of or in addition to state law
claims. 121
Second, by offering a basis for federal jurisdiction over not-quite-
pendent state claims, CAFA enables lawyers to bring federal and state
claims together in a way that was previously blocked in federal court.
When a federal claim is joined with a state claim, CAFA allows the
claims to be pursued together in federal court as long as the class ac-
tion meets CAFA's jurisdictional requirements, regardless of whether• • . 122
the court would exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Employees of-
ten pursue state law wage-and-hour claims along with federal FLSA
claims,12 3 and federal courts may decline supplemental jurisdiction
120 FJC TIiiRD INTERIM REPORT, suna note 71, at 11. Because the increase in labor
class actions constituted such a significant portion of the cases, the report repeatedly
stressed the distinction between diversity cases, which could be attributed to CAFA,
and federal question cases, which could not. See id. at 2 ("Much of that increase was in
federal question cases, especially labor class actions, and thus not attributable to the
effects of CAFA."); id. at 4 ("[A] great deal of that increase in class action activity was in
labor cases, and thus was not attributable to CAFA."). More recently, however, the FJC
report's authors have acknowledged that CAFA might have affected federal question
filings. See Lee & Willging, supra note 74, at 1749 ("It is possible, however, that CAFA
may increase the number of federal question original proceedings indirectly, at the
margins.").
121 See Lee & Willging, supra note 74, at 1749.
122 See 28 U.S.C. § 136 7 (a) (2000) (limiting supplemental jurisdiction to claims
that form part of the same controversy); id. § 1367(c) (permitting federal courts to de-
cline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims).
123 See, e.g., In re Farmers Ins. Exch. Claims Representatives' Overtime Pay Litig.,
No. MDL 1439, 2003 WL 23669376, at *1 (D. Or. May 19, 2003) (outlining plaintiffs'
complaint under FLSA and state law asserting that employer unlawfully refused to
grant overtime pay); Trotter v. Perdue Farms, Inc., No. 99-0893, 2001 WL 1002448, at
*1 (D. Del. Aug. 16, 2001) (describing plaintiffs' claims under FLSA, ERISA, and state
law, asserting that employer failed to compensate employees for time spent complying
with OSHA requirements); Ansoumana v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81,
83-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (detailing plaintiffs' claims under FLSA and state law asserting
that employer paid them less than minimum wage).
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over such state law claims. 2 4 CAFA, by conferring federal jurisdiction
over the class action state law claims, facilitates federal court adjudica-
tion of wage-and-hour cases in their entirety.
Third, by altering the class action environment, CAFA may have
forced some class action lawyers to adapt by shifting their practice into
areas that have a greater likelihood of success in federal court. Given
the nature of mass litigation practice, in which litigation opportunities
must be evaluated prior to the investment of substantial resources and
attorney time, it is plausible that CAFA could have caused some class
action lawyers to shift some of their practice into federal question
cases, with the idea that if large class actions will be in federal court,
they may as well pursue the claims with the greatest likelihood of fed-
eral class certification and success on the merits. To the extent CAFA
reduced the appeal of investment opportunities in certain state law
class actions, it could have led attorneys to pursue more appealing op-
tions in federal court.
On the other hand, the growth in FLSA and federal consumer
class actions may have had nothing to do with CAFA, and may simply
reflect an increase in the number of such cases. Before CAFA took ef-
fect, FLSA class actions were already on the rise;' 2 the sharper post-
CAFA increase and then flattening may have been the culmination of
a developing practice area rather than a CAFA effect. Moreover,
many FLSA class actions are filed by employment litigation special-
ists-indeed, a significant percentage of them are filed by a single
Florida firm. 126 A prevalence of specialists diminishes the likelihood
124 See De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 311-12 (3d Cir. 2003) (re-
versing decision to grant supplemental jurisdiction where state law wage-and-hour
claim was raised late and presented complex issues unnecessary for the FLSA claim).
State law wage-and-hour claims ordinarily are pursued as opt-out class actions, whereas
the FLSA establishes an opt-in procedure. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000).
125 Whether because of changes in employment practices, new federal regulations,
or other reasons, FLSA class actions nearly tripled from 2001 to 2004. See Amy 1.
Stickel, FLSA Suits Take Plight, COUNSEL TO COUNSEL, Mar. 2005, at 16, 17 (reporting,
based on data compiled by LexisNexis CourtLink, that the number of FLSA class ac-
tions filed in federal district courts rose from 397 in 2001 to 1076 in 2004); see also
Samuel D. Walker &Jennifer E. Chung, Trends in Workplace Litigation: The Rising
Popularity of FLSA Class Actions 2-3 (Aug. 9, 1999) (unpublished conference paper),
available at http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/annual/99/annual29.pdf (argu-
ing that large-scale FLSA suits in the year prior to the article's publication demon-
strated that such claims would continue to gain popularity).
126 See Stickel, supra note 125, at 17 ("Several Florida lawyers and firms account for
the lion's share of [FLSA] suits, as some of those attorneys have apparently started
their own cottage industry in this area of the law."). Nearly half of the FLSA class ac-
tions filed in 2004 were filed in the Southern District of Florida. Id. One firm, the
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that CAFA-induced claim selection explains the growth. Federal con-
sumer protection class actions, too, had been rising for several years
before CAFA, although they rose faster when CAFA took effect.1
27
Without further quantitative or qualitative research, it is impossible to
say exactly what caused the increase in certain types of federal ques-
tion class actions. 12 Nonetheless, the post-CAFA increase in certain
types of federal question cases is hard to ignore. As the most recent
FJC progress report states, "[t]hat the largest percentage increase in
Shavitz Law Group, represented the named plaintiff in 227 FLSA class actions in 2004,
accounting for over forty percent of the FLSA class actions in the district and twenty-
one percent of the FLSA class actions filed in the United States. Id. at 17-18. The
Shavitz firm devotes its practice to wage-and-hour claims. See Shavitz Law Group,
About Us, http://www.shavitzlaw.com/about_us.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2008)
("Founded in December, 1999, the Shavitz Law Group is ... dedicated to representing
employees, both current and former, who have disputes regarding unpaid wages. The
claims litigated by the Shavitz Law Group pertain to violations of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act which is the law that regulates the payment of overtime wages for hours
worked in excess of forty within a work week."); see also Jessica M. Walker, Are FLSA
Suits Too-Lucrative Labors for Plaintiffs Attorneys?, DAILY BUS. REV. (Fla.), Dec. 16, 2005,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/PubArticle.jsp?id=1134641114326 (discussing a
legal battle between Shavitz and defense counsel over legal fees).
The prominence of the Shavitz firm and the Southern District of Florida in FLSA
class action litigation explains an otherwise surprising difference between the FJC's
Second Interim Report and Third Interim Report on CAFA. In contrast to the Third
Interim Report, in the Second Interim Report the FJC did not observe a significant
growth in labor class actions: "Labor cases, which consist primarily of federal Fair La-
bor Standards Act (FLSA) and Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
cases, increased somewhat after CAFA went into effect but not to a statistically signifi-
cant degree." THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IM-
PACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005: SECOND INTERIM REPORT TO THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 8 (2006) [hereinafter
FJC SECOND INTERIM REPORT]. The Second Interim Report included data from the
eighty-five district courts that used the Case Management/Electronic Case Filing
("CM/ECF") system and had created electronic docketing records for cases filed as of
July 1, 2001. Id. at 1. The Southern District of Florida subsequently installed the
CM/ECF system, enabling the FJC to include it in the study. See FJC THIRD INTERIM
REPORT, supra note 71, at 1 ("This report includes data for the entire five-year study
period from three district courts not included in the previous report (the Southern
District of California, the Southern District of Florida, and the District of New Mexico);
the CM/ECF system was recently installed in these districts, making their inclusion in
the study possible.").
127 Federal consumer class actions in federal court increased by ten percent in
2003, by eleven percent in 2004, and by seventeen percent in 2005. FJC PROGRESS RE-
PORT, supra note 77, at 6.
128 The FJC expects that the next phase of its class actions study will shed some
light on this. See id. at 7 ("[W]hen Phase II of the study is completed, we will be able to
determine whether some of this increase was caused by more consumer cases being
brought as federal question cases because of CAFA.").
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the number of [federal consumer protection class actions] occurred
in the same year as CAFA became law suggests a CAFA effect."' 9
While the effect is difficult to pinpoint, it appears that CAFA has al-
tered the mix of claims pursued by class action lawyers. With the likeli-
hood of litigating in federal court, class action lawyers appear less in-
clined to pursue personal injury tort claims and increasingly interested
in contract, fraud, wage-and-hour, and consumer protection claims.
C. CAFA's Impact on the Class Action Bar
Given the adjustments the statute has brought in class action fo-
rum and claim selection, CAFA appears likely to strengthen the more
powerful class action firms while marginalizing others. 30 Five CAFA-
induced shifts in class action practice portend such consolidation of
power within the class action bar: the shift from state court to federal
court, from rural counties to urban centers, from personal injury to
economic injury, from state claims to federal claims, and from multi-
ple lead class counsel to single lead counsel or committee.
A shift from state court to federal court-the most significant and
direct impact of CAFA-favors firms with greater federal court experi-
ence.13 1  It disfavors law firms with a higher comfort level in state
court, 32 and particularly firms with practices dependent upon strong
connections to particular state courts.
129 Id. at 6-7. But see Lee & Willging, supra note 74, at 1758 ("Both Labor and Con-
sumer Protection/Fraud class actions reached their highest observed level in 2005, the
year in which CAFA became law. But that, in itself, is not evidence of a CAFA effect.").
130 Deborah Hensler made this observation a year before CAFA was enacted, as
quoted in a legal news article: "'The legislation will empower the larger, more nation-
ally oriented firms' at the expense of smaller firms practicing in state courts. She said
she sees a trend in which large, well-financed plaintiffs' firms will match the deep
pockets and experience of their counterparts." Michael Bobelian, Congress Eyes Major
Class Action Reforms, N.J. L.J.,Jan. 12, 2004, at 9.
131 See id. ("'My practice, in a perverse way, will benefit,' said Weiss, whose firm has
extensive experience in federal courts and is in a strong financial position." (quoting
class action lawyer Melvyn Weiss)).
132 An FJC study of class action forum selection found that the tendency to file in
state or federal court varies by lawyer:
Attorneys were asked about the percentage of their civil cases that they had
filed in federal court in the past five years. Responses indicated that the prob-
ability of filing in state court generally varies in the same direction as the at-
torneys' recent filing activity. Attorneys filing class actions in state court re-
ported filing 30% of all their civil litigation in federal court in the past five
years. Attorneys filing class actions in federal court reported filing 46% of
their civil litigation in federal court.
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Moreover, the post-CAFA horizontal shift in plaintiff-preferred ju-
risdictions yields winners and losers. The winners are firms with multi-
ple offices to support a changing forum-selection strategy, and espe-
cially firms with established presences in the favored post-CAFA federal
forums, which include the big cities of the Ninth, Third, and Second
Circuits. Consider the advantage, in this regard, of the nation's largest
class action firms. Coughlin Stoia has offices in San Diego, San Fran-
cisco, Los Angeles, New York, Boca Raton, Washington, Houston, and
Philadelphia. Milberg Weiss has offices in New York and Los Angeles.
Lieff Cabraser has offices in San Francisco, New York, and Nashville.
Bernstein Litowitz has offices in New York, New Jersey, San Diego, and
New Orleans. Hagens Berman has offices in Seattle, Chicago, Cam-
bridge, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and San Francisco. By contrast, the
Lakin Law Firm-the most frequent filer of pre-CAFA class actions in
Madison County-has a single office in Wood River, Illinois. 1
33
The post-CAFA shift in claim selection likely favors the same firms
as the shift in forum selection. A move from personal injury claims to
economic injury claims, as well as a move toward more federal ques-
tion class actions, favors firms with greater experience in commercial
disputes, economic loss analysis, and federal law claims, which gener-
ally means the larger law firms.
Shifting class actions from state court to federal court affects class
counsel in another way. It increases the likelihood of a single lead
counsel or committee, rather than multiple class counsel or commit-
tees in multiple courts. When related class actions are pending in
Willging & Wheatman, supra note 92, at 614; cf. Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of
Ordinary Cases to Litigators of Extraordinary Cases: Stratiication of the Plaintiffs' Bar in the
Twenty-First Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 219, 230 (2001) (describing stratification within
the plaintiffs' bar and changes "at the top end of the spectrum").
133 Another leading filer of Madison County class actions before CAFA was the six-
lawyer firm of Freed & Weiss. See McCann, supra note 3, at 8 ("To proponents of class-
action reform, Weiss is the enemy, an attorney who they say enriches himself and hurts
the business community while his clients receive coupons or relatively small cash
awards. Weiss also is a leading class-action attorney in downstate Madison County,
which national business groups hold up as a poster county for 'jackpot justice' and the
abuse of class-action lawsuits."). Freed & Weiss's sole office is in Chicago. In contrast
to other big-city office locations such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, and
Philadelphia, the city of Chicago-located in the class-unfriendly Seventh Circuit-
holds less advantage for post-CAFA class action specialists. The advantage of an Illinois
office had always depended on the ability to pursue class actions in state court,
whether in Cook County or in southern Illinois; nearly all of the successful class actions
listed on the Freed & Weiss website "Results" page were filed in Madison and St. Clair
counties. See Freed & Weiss, LLC-Class Actions, http://www.freedweiss.com/
results.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
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multiple state courts, no mechanism currently exists to gather the
cases before a single court. 34 By contrast, when related class actions
are pending in multiple federal district courts, they can be transferred
to a single federal district court for coordinated pretrial proceedings
under the multidistrict litigation (MDL) statute.' 35 The MDL judge
may address class certification and appointment of class counsel on a
consolidated basis. MDL, combined with the amended Rule 2 3(g) re-
quirement of appointment of class counsel, increases the attention
paid to the appointment of class counsel, and substantially decreases
the chance of multiple firms going forward with their own overlap-
ping or related class actions in multiple courts. One would expect this
environment to favor firms with stronger national reputations, experi-
ence, and connections, rather than firms with a more local presence.
In 1995, class action opponents won legislation aimed at reducing
class action abuse and driven by a mistrust of class action lawyers. In-
deed, some say the legislation was aimed at bringing down the leading
class action lawyers. The PSLRA tightened controls on mistrusted
class action lawyers through tougher pleading requirements and an
altered counsel selection process, while leaving the basic class certifi-
cation standard intact. Far from bringing the downfall of leading class
action firms, however, the statute had the opposite effect. Both the
pleading standard and the counsel selection process made it difficult
for weaker firms to compete, and worked to the advantage of the
plaintiffs' firms with the greatest resources.
Ten years later, class action opponents won legislation aimed at
reducing class action abuse and driven by a mistrust of class action
lawyers. CAFA expanded federal jurisdiction over class actions, pre-
sumably providing a more vigilant set of monitors, and imposed addi-
tional constraints on class action lawyers, while leaving the basic class
certification standard intact. Like the PSLRA before it, CAFA appears
likely to strengthen the leading class action firms, while marginalizing
weaker ones.
134 See UNIF. TRANSFER OF LITIG. ACT § 201, 14 U.L.A. 677 (1991) (proposing a
uniform state statute to allow consolidation of actions pending in multiple state
courts); see also Edward H. Cooper, Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison of the ALI Pro-
ject with the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, 54 LA. L. REV. 897, 905-06 (1994) (compar-
ing potential approaches to interstate consolidation); Mark C. Weber, Complex Litiga-
tion and the State Courts: Constitutional and Practical Advantages of the State Forum over the
Federal Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215, 268 (1994) (discussing
the possibility of states adopting the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act).
135 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
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CAFA has driven more class action litigation into federal court,
where the larger firms generally have more experience. It has altered
the forum-selection game so that the forums favored by class action
plaintiffs are not the "magnet jurisdictions" of the pre-CAFA era, but
the federal district courts in Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, and
Philadelphia, where the larger firms have offices. It appears to have
brought a reduction in personal injury class actions, with which smaller
firms may have more experience, and an increase in contract, fraud,
and labor class actions involving economic harm. Finally, by bringing
more class actions into federal court, with the availability of MDL trans-
fer and the Rule 23 (g) process for appointment of class counsel, CAFA
increases the likelihood of a single proceeding for naming lead counsel.
While CAFA was the product of lobbying from class action opponents,
not class action lawyers, the early data on its effects suggest that once
again, the leading class action firms may come out on top.
D. CAFA 's Impact on Nonclass Litigation
CAFA's proponents hoped136-and its opponents feared131 -that
the Act would reduce class certifications. Whether by exacerbating
choice-of-law problems in national market cases, creating class action
docket pressures in federal courts, or removing questionable class ac-
tions from certification-friendly state courts, CAFA was widely ex-
pected to make class certification more difficult. It is too early to
evaluate the accuracy of these predictions, given the time lag between
commencement of an action and the class certification decision. 131
The next phase of the FJC's empirical study will shed light on post-
136 See Edward A. Purcell,Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the
New in FederalJurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. (2008) 1823, 1864 ("The conviction
that animated most of CAFA's supporters was that the federal courts were much less
likely to certify suits as class actions than were state courts and that denials of certification
would, one way or another, quickly and abruptly end many, if not most, of them.").
137 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA 's Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 13-15, on file with author) (argu-
ing that by applying federal jurisdiction but not federal substantive law or choice of law
to national market cases, CAFA renders class certification unlikely); Class Action Litiga-
tion: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 12-13 (2002) (statement of
Thomas J. Henderson, Chief Counsel, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law) (raising a concern that docket constriction in federal court would create pressure
to deny class certification) (quoted in Lee & Willging, supra note 74, at 1742).
1 CAFA applies only to class actions commenced on or after February 18, 2005.
The class certification decision often occurs well after commencement of an action.
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CAFA class certification patterns. 39 Given the adjustments class action
plaintiffs' lawyers have made in forum selection14 ° and claim selec-
tion, 141 CAFA may have a smaller impact on class certification rates
than many expected. Nevertheless, in the context of analyzing
CAFA's impact on mass litigators, it is worth asking how a decrease in
class certification might play out.
One of the important lessons of recent mass litigation is that, with
the notable exception of small-claims class actions, lawyers often find
ways to litigate and settle mass disputes on a collective basis regardless
of whether any court grants class certification. 142  Lawyers achieve
economies of scale by representing large numbers of similarly situated
clients and coordinating with other counsel. They litigate on behalf
of the group, pursuing collective interests, and they negotiate aggre-
gate deals that often resemble class action settlements.143 If CAFA re-
duces class certifications as expected, then it is likely to increase the
number of claims resolved on a mass nonclass basis. One irony of
CAFA, then, could be that a statute driven by mistrust of lawyers and
aimed at enhancing judicial supervision may actually reduce the level
of supervision over the litigation and resolution of mass disputes. 144
In class actions, multiple law firms sometimes compete for posi-
tion, 145 and courts are empowered to appoint class counsel. 46 The
139 FJC PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 77, at 1-3.
140 See supra Part III.A.
141 See supra Part III.B.
See Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 69, at 530-43 (exploring various
forms of nonclass collective litigation and settlement, and their similarities to class ac-
tions); Erichson, Mississippi Class Actions, supra note 69, at 287-96 (showing the extent
of mass aggregate litigation in Mississippi despite that state's lack of a class action
rule).
143 See generally Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 69 (describing mass col-
lective representation); Howard M. Erichson, A 7ypology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1769 (2005) (describing collective negotiation and group settlements).
14 In non-class actions, courts generally lack authority to decide which lawyers
may represent a mass of plaintiffs, how much compensation the lawyers receive, and
whether a settlement is fair, whereas class actions triggerjudicial supervision over all of
these matters. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e) (requiring court approval of class action set-
tlement); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g) (requiring judicial appointment of class counsel); FED.
R. CWI. P. 23(h) (regulating judicial awards of class counsel fees); see also FED. R. CRT. P.
23(a)(4) (requiring a finding of adequate representation as a prerequisite for class
certification).
145 See generally Third Circuit Task Force Report on Selection of Class Counsel, 74 TEMPLE
L. REv. 689 (2001), reprinted in 208 F.R.D. 340 (2002) (analyzing district court judges'
policies toward selection of class counsel nationwide).
146 FED. R. CI. P. 23(g).
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coordinating power of federal courts magnifies the class counsel ap-
pointment decision, and can be expected to favor lawyers with greater
resources, reputations, and networks.14  In nonclass mass litigation,
lawyers make similar plays for position. Rather than the appointment
of class counsel, nonclass litigation involves appointment of lead and
liaison counsel and steering committees in multidistrict litigation and
statewide consolidated proceedings, and may involve attempts by lead-
ing plaintiffs' lawyers to negotiate nonclass settlements on behalf of
claimant populations much broader than the lawyers' own clients.
Judges anxious to accomplish comprehensive resolutions of mass dis-
putes, even in litigation uncertifiable as class actions, abet counsel by
instigating global settlement talks and by lending the court's imprima-
tur to an aggregate settlement.148 Just as post-CAFA class action prac-
tice appears skewed in favor of the strongest firms, nonclass mass liti-
gation favors the dominant players on the plaintiffs' side. Thus, even
if CAFA proves to reduce class certifications, sending more litigation
into nonclass aggregation, it may have a similar effect.
CONCLUSION
CAFA's proponents were right about at least one thing: CAFA ap-
pears to have effected a marked shift in class action activity from state
courts to federal courts. Maybe they were correct as well in expecting
federal courts to supervise class actions more rigorously than some
state courts, although the statute's impact on class certifications and
settlements remains to be seen.
What many of CAFA's proponents probably failed to anicipate,
however, is the resilience of class action lawyers, the ways in which
lawyers adapt to jurisdictional reform, and the follow-on effects of
such adaptations. The expansion of federal jurisdiction does not sim-
ply shift cases to federal court by removal from plaintiff-selected state
courts; it fundamentally changes the forum-selection game. Post-
CAFA class action forum selection, early data suggest, favors federal
courts in Los Angeles, San Francisco, New Jersey, Philadelphia, and
New York-a far cry from such pre-CAFA magnet jurisdictions as
Madison County, Illinois, and Beaumont, Texas. Nor does the expan-
sion of federal jurisdiction simply shift the forum for the same set of
147 See supra text accompanying notes 134-135.
148 Noteworthy recent examples include Judge Jack Weinstein in the Zyprexa liti-
gation, In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1596 (E.D.N.Y.), and Judge Eldon
Fallon in the Vioxx litigation, In reVioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657 (E.D. La.).
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claims; it alters the balance of litigation. There seems to have been a
shift away from personal injury class actions and a growth in contract,
fraud, wage-and-hour, and consumer protection cases. As CAFA's im-
pact plays out, there will be winners and losers, and seasoned class ac-
tion observers may experience a bit of dfjA vu. Just as a decade ago
the PSLRA's pleading reform and lead plaintiff reform surprised its
promoters by strengthening the dominant class action firms, CAFA's
jurisdictional reform now appears poised to have a similar impact.
What, if anything, does this mean for whether CAFA should be
considered a success? The answer depends on how one perceives
CAFA's objectives. If CAFA's proponents expected it to squelch class
actions, the statute appears unlikely to achieve that goal. Similarly, if
CAFA's proponents expected the statute to disempower the class ac-
tion bar or its most powerful members, they are in for disappoint-
ment. But if the point was to deprive class action plaintiffs of their fa-
vorite state court forums and to reduce the franchise of class action
lawyers with forum-dependent practices, then the statute appears to
be succeeding.
CAFA tempers forum selection. Class action plaintiffs are less
likely to avail themselves of anomalously plaintiff-friendly or class-
friendly state forums, but federal forum selection by class action plain-
tiffs' lawyers ensures that neither can defendants depend upon par-
ticularly class-skeptical federal forums. Like other recent class action
reforms, CAFA neither alters the standard for class certification nor
asserts any intent to undermine class actions. Indeed, the statute pur-
ports to support class actions as an "important and valuable part of the
legal system."' 49  CAFA's proponents spoke instead of class action
abuse by unscrupulous lawyers and state judges willing to certify mar-
ginal class actions and willing to approve exploitative settlements.
While its ultimate impact on certifications and settlements remains to
be seen, the statute's effect on forum selection is already apparent.
Given the adaptations of class action lawyers, however, the statute ap-
pears unlikely to obliterate class actions or to diminish the power of
the elite class action bar. In other words, CAFA may be achieving its
stated objective while failing to achieve an unstated agenda.
,49 CAFA § 2(a)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005); see also id. § 2(b)(1)
(stating that a purpose of the act is to "assure fair and prompt recoveries for class
members with legitimate claims"); supra note 30 and accompanying text (quoting
President Bush on the "valuable purpose" served by class actions).
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